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No. 3240. 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
OCTOBER TERM, 1918. 
F. L. BYRON AND CHARLES S. AUSTIN, 
RESPONDENTS, 
vs. 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, A CoRPORATION, 
APPELLANT, 
AND 
JOHN KNUDSON AND GEORGE C. EARL, 
DEFENDANTS, 
AND 
STEPHEN HAYS, IMPLEADED AS AN ADDITIONAL 
DEFENDANT, RESPONDENT. 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
Hon. George F. Goodwin, Judge. 
REPLY BRIEF ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT. 
Counsel say that the omission to bring up a bill 
of exceptions was for reasons "best known to appel-
lants." Obviously, the reasons for the omission cannot 
affect the judgment of this court either the one way 
or the other. But justice and a sense of fairness 
in repelling the insinuation that such a bill might have 
been unfavorable, demands that it be stated that the 
omission was attributable to a misunderstanding be-
tween counsel, whereunder the time to file the bill 
was inadvertently permitted to expire. 
It is true that the deed itself is not in the record, 
nor is the lease. But its exact terms quoted in our 
main brief are in the identical language of the court's 
findings of fact. 
Our statements of fact are limited to the court's 
finding. Where we mentioned a fact, we referred to 
every page of the record where it was touched upon, 
whether in the pleadings, the opinion, or the findings; 
but in each instance the statement of fact is limited 
to the finding of fact. 
Counsel devote much of their brief to asserting 
a presumption that the findings were borne out by 
the evidence. No such question is presented here. 
The finding that Hays was the "owner," etc., was 
not a finding of the ultimate fact in the sense that 
such expressions were used in the cases cited by 
counsel. 
There can be no assumption that there was some 
other warranty deed from the Copper Company to 
Hays. No such deed is mentioned in the findings. It 
would not have been admissible under the pleadings. 
The complaint asserted that Hays owned the ore simply 
and solely by virtue of the reservation in his deed. 
That is all the court found. That is all the court could 
have found under the pleadings. To cast about for 
an excuse to defeat justice in this case upon any such 
unwarranted assumption as is suggested, is not worthy 
of the effort of a court of conscience. 
We may say the same thing as to the assumption 
that the deed may have contained provisions other 
than those recited in the complaint and found by the 
court. A decision predicated upon such an idea would 
be pitiful. It is just such strained ideas that have 
brought reproach upon some courts and the legal pro-
fession. It converts a litigation from an investigation 
of truth into a mere game. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DICKSON, ELLIS & LUCAS, 
L. F. ADAMSON, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
